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Abstract 
As the application of computer technology continues to 
proliferate and diversify, vehicles are becoming increasingly 
intelligent and it is expected that in the near future they will 
be equipped with radio interfaces for short range 
communications. This will enable the formation of vehicular 
networks, commonly referred to as VANETs, an instance of 
mobile ad hoc networks with vehicles as mobile nodes. 
Vehicular networks are receiving a lot of attention due to the 
wide variety of services they can provide and are likely to be 
deployed commercially in coming years. Security is a 
fundamental issue because such networks will provide the 
necessary infrastructure for various applications that can help 
improve the safety of road traffic. Effective security of 
vehicular ad hoc network is an ill-defined problem as most 
existing security mechanisms available for VANET do not 
combine efficiency, security and traceability. They tend to 
score well in one or two qualities, but not all three because of 
the potential contradictions between some of their attributes. 
In this paper, we give an overview of VANETs and the 
security challenges related to their deployment. We identify 
and analyse current security limitations, then an effort is made 
to show that efficiency, security and traceability are the key 
qualities to consider while implementing an effective security 
mechanism. Therefore the most suitable way to achieve this 
goal is by identifying the intersection point connecting their 
attributes. 
1 Introduction 
A Vehicular Ad hoc Network (VANET) is an emerging 
technology that uses moving cars as nodes in a network to 
create mobile networks. VANETs enable vehicles to 
communicate amongst themselves (V2V communications) 
and with road-side infrastructure (V2I communications). 
Every participating car is turned into a wireless router or 
node, allowing connection between other cars in a radius 
approximately of 100 to 300 meters, thus creating a network 
with a wide range [9]. Such networks present various 
functionalities in terms of vehicular safety, traffic congestion 
reduction, location based service (LBS) applications [7] and 
many other services to drivers but they are also exposed to a 
variety of risks while carrying out these functions.  
Information technology has gained central importance for 
many new automotive scope applications services [12] and 
despite significant amount of research carried out in order to 
protect drivers within a VANET environment, none of the 
published solutions guarantee a complete security [2]. 
Existing security mechanisms leave a lot of improvements to 
be made as there are still many issues in relation to 
authentication left unaddressed. This report will define our 
perception of Effective Security for vehicular networks, 
analyses some existing security mechanisms, and discuss 
potential limitations and paradoxes related to their properties.  
Furthermore, an effort will be made to show that effective 
security in VANET can be achieved by identifying the most 
suitable intersection point connecting Efficiency, Security and 
Traceability. 
The main contributions of this paper are as followed: (1) We 
have classified attacks into broad categories; (2) existing 
contradictions in regards to security in Vehicular network 
systems have been highlighted. Furthermore, (3) an effective 
security model for VANETs systems has then been proposed. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we 
gave a brief overview of VANET technology, followed by a 
security analysis in Section 3. Section 4 details the proposed 
model for an effective security system in Vehicular Networks 
and Section 5 presents our conclusion and future work.   
2 Overview of VANET 
Until very recently, road vehicles design was a field 
dominated by mechanical engineers. Factors including the 
dropping cost of electronic components and the enduring 
enthusiasm of the car manufacturers to boost road safety and 
to distinguish themselves from their contestants, has led to 
vehicles becoming “computers on wheels”, or rather 
“computer networks on wheels” embedded with technologies 
such as collision avoidance systems, parking assistance and 
others [6]. VANET can then be defined as communication 
network composed of vehicles (cars, buses, trucks and so on) 
and road side base stations with the purpose to provide 
ubiquitous connectivity while on the road to mobile users, 
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who are otherwise connected to the outside world through 
other networks. Vehicular Ad hoc Network (VANET) is 
regarded as the first commercial version of Mobile Ad hoc 
Networks (MANETs) as well as one of its most promising 
application scenarios [8,14]. The roots of ad hoc network 
could be traced back as far as 1968 [3] with early project in 
1972 developed by the Defence Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA). 
Figure 1 shows a graphical depiction of a Vehicular Ad hoc 
network. The unloading vehicle blocks a route and the 
surrounding vehicles can adopt alternative routes to avoid 
disruption. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
    
Before analysing security aspects related to VANETs 
systems, it will be necessary to define the following 
terminologies: 
x Effective Security in VANET. This is a VANET security 
system that combines efficiency, security and 
traceability.  
x Ill-defined Problem. This is a problem with existing 
definitions not taking into consideration all required 
specifications. 
x Traceability. This is the ability to trace the location and 
history of vehicle activity by means of recorded data. 
x Efficiency. This is the ability to produce a desired effect 
with a minimum amount of effort or waste. 
 
3 Security Analysis 
In recent years, there have been an excessive number of 
contributions related to security in vehicular networks. Most 
of these researches were based on different techniques 
designed to improve security and protect communicating 
members against a number of potential attacks. An effective 
security mechanism should be able to handle threats targeting 
the availability, the confidentiality and the authenticity of data 
in regards to communication between vehicles and 
infrastructures in a VANET enabled environment. Indeed 
most security mechanisms available for VANET do not 
combine Efficiency, Security and Traceability [1]. They tend 
to score well in their provision of one or two qualities, but not 
all three because of the potential contradictions between some 
of their properties, therefore Effective Security is still an ill-
defined problem. Security plays an essential role in Vehicular 
Ad-hoc Networks and in the absence of an effective security 
mechanism, malicious parties could inject bogus information 
within the network, causing serious accidents.   
 
Secure data communication is a well-researched area in 
Information Technology, despite the significant volume of 
devastating attacks that still occur. VANET technologies pose 
different security threats and requirements therefore create a 
new research challenge preventing the use of existing network 
security solutions [14].   
This section explores various network security problems, 
analyses key security requirements and demonstrates that an 
effective security mechanism should be rigorous and should 
ensure that the information received is correct, the source is 
who he claims to be and that privacy of the user sending 
messages can be preserved. 
Before reviewing the potential attacks that can be mounted in 
vehicular networks, it is important to comment on possible 
attackers. 
3.1 Attackers 
Effective security in VANETs is vital as the reason of their 
very existence relates to significant life threatening situations. 
The ideal solution should allow drivers to distinguish genuine 
members of the network from malicious individuals by 
determining the liability of each driver while maintaining 
their privacy. The motivation behind VANET was to merge 
various disciplines involving engineers, computers scientists, 
psychologists, legislators and others professionals together 
with car manufacturers in order to make driving more secured 
and comfortable. Attackers also have their own role to play 
and predicting their dynamic behaviour is very difficult. An 
advantage of VANETs over other ad hoc network systems is 
that they can provide sufficient computational and power 
resources. Indeed a typical vehicle will be able to host 
numerous microprocessors [6]. 
In [6], Raya and Hubaux classify attackers as having four 
dimensions and  characterize them by Membership 
.Motivation.Method.Scope, where Membership represent an 
Insider or an Outsider, Motivation for Malicious or Rational, 
Method for Active or Passive and Scope for Local or 
Extended.  
 
Figure 1:  A graphical depiction of a Vehicular Ad hoc 
NETwork (VANET). (Image Extracted from CAR 2 CAR 
Communication Consortium at www.car-to-car.org/). 
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3.2 Possible Attacks 
Vehicular Ad hoc NETworks may suffer from a high number 
of attacks although it can be difficult to envisage all possible 
attack scenarios that will be launched in the future. Therefore 
it is critical to have a clear understanding of the different 
ways in which VANET technologies could be attacked. In 
this paper, attacks have been grouped into two broad 
categories (Logical and Physical) as illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.1 Logical Attacks 
Logical attacks typically involve sending messages to a 
device and observing its responses. Attackers exploit 
weaknesses or bugs in the overall architecture as well as 
limitations in the design of security mechanisms in order to 
trick a device into revealing keys or allowing them to run 
malicious piece of code.  
In [6], Raya and Hubaux Considering attacks perpetrated 
against messages sent between nodes rather than those 
targeting physical equipment. Attacks on VANETs were 
outlined as Basic attacks and Sophisticated attacks. 
Further attacker behaviours were discussed by Sumra et al 
[11] where a number of new possible attacks in vehicular 
networks were identified as illustrated below: 
 
 
 
 
While concentrating our efforts on attacks perpetrated against 
the message itself, it appears that most threats to VANET 
systems could be organised into three main groups: 
 
a. Threats to Availability 
 
The following threats to the availability of V2V and V2I have 
been identified: 
x Malware 
x Spamming 
x Denial of Service (DoS) 
x Black Hole Attack 
x Broadcast Tampering 
b. Threats to Confidentiality 
The most prominent VANET attack in this group is 
Eavesdropping [4]. In this scenario, internal or external 
attackers can be located in moving or motionless vehicles 
attempting to collect private information from other road 
users during the transmission of broadcast messages without 
the sender/receiver knowledge and authorisation.  
c. Threats to Authentication 
Authentication is the core security requirement in VANET. It 
provides message integrity in order to avoid message 
manipulation over the network. Most applications using this 
technology will require authentication. This may involve 
protecting legitimate nodes from attackers penetrating the 
network using a false identity, revealing spoofed GPS signals, 
suppressing vital information, fabricating, altering or 
replaying legitimate messages and injecting incorrect material 
to damage and affect communication amongst vehicles within 
the network. In this group, threats may include the following: 
x Replay attack 
x Position Faking 
x Global Positioning system (GPS) Spoofing 
x Masquerading 
x Sybil attack 
x Certificate replication / Key management 
x Message Tampering / Manipulation 
x Tunneling 
 
3.2.2 Physical Attacks 
Physical attacks refer to attacks that exploit the system 
implementation by identifying its properties. This involve 
getting access to pieces of equipment such as the Tamper-
Proof Device (TPD) and the Event Data Recorder (EDR) to 
observe, manipulate and interfere with the system internals. 
This category of attack may be harder to deploy due to the 
relatively expensive infrastructure required. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Broad categories of attacks in VANETs 
 
Figure 3: New possible attacks in VANETs 
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3.3 Discussion on Existing security Mechanisms 
We live in a society where information is ubiquitous. Data are 
all around us and due to the fast advancement and invasive 
deployment of Information Technologies in the automobile 
industry, both modern high-speed motorways and recently 
designed vehicles are becoming increasingly intelligent. 
Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) are advanced applications 
which aim to provide innovative services relating to different 
modes of transport and traffic management and enable 
various users to be better informed and make safer, more 
coordinated use of transport networks. ITS is a system in 
which information and communication technologies are 
applied in the field of road transport. In one aspect, due to 
commercial implications of VANET enabled system 
deployment, many organisations are committed to its rapid 
development although it is estimated that the first systems 
that will integrate this technology are military, police and fire 
vehicles to communicate with each other for safety purposes. 
In the other aspect, road traffic injuries are predicted to rise 
from their current position as the ninth leading cause of death 
to become the fifth leading cause of death by 2030 if further 
actions are not taken, as highlighted on the Global status 
report on road safety. Therefore a number of organizations 
such as the World Health Organization, the World Bank, the 
United Nations and many other are joining forces to address 
the problem. 
 
In recent years there has been a plethora of contribution in 
VANET security. This section provides an analysis of some 
existing security mechanisms. 
 
a. PKI (Public Key Infrastructure)  
Based on asymmetric cryptography concepts requiring two 
separate keys, PKI is widely used in VANET systems. This 
authentication mechanism uses Public key and Private Key to 
secure users identification and location while avoiding 
backtracking by unauthorized. For private key security, a 
Tamper-proof device is needed in each vehicle, allowing 
secret information storage and outgoing messages to be 
signed. However, this scheme requires a large key and 
certificate posing storage concerns. 
b. TESLA (Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerance 
Authentication)  
TESLA was used as an authentication mechanism for 
multicast and broadcast network communications. In this 
scheme, symmetric cryptography was used instead of 
asymmetric cryptography while providing the necessary 
asymmetric elements. Though TESLA was vulnerable to 
storage based Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. 
 
c. TESLA++ 
 
To overcome TESLA weaknesses, a more advanced 
authentication mechanism was developed yet raises other 
concerns. Despite all improved functionalities including 
prevention of memory based DoS attacks, better 
authentication techniques, TESLA++ could offer neither non-
repudiation nor multi-hop authentication. Therefore also 
failed to meet the utmost Security mechanism requirements. 
 
d. ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature algorithm) 
 
ECDSA was accepted worldwide as a standard to provide 
secure and faster dissemination of information after user 
authentication. Although ECDSA scheme performed well by 
reducing the scope of attacks, we had more wireless errors 
and less packets received. 
 
e. VAST (VANET Authentication using Signatures and 
TESLA++) 
 
VANETs require an effective mechanism which provides 
more than just packet authentication, but also Non-
repudiation, multi-hop communication, DoS resilience, real -
time guarantee as discussed above. VAST using a 
combination of ECDSA signatures and TESLA++ techniques 
to verify each packet fulfils many of these requirements were 
met in [10], maintaining acceptable authentication delays with 
a worst case of 107ms. Despite all efforts, there is still no 
published work able to guarantee a full effective security. 
 
3.4. Paradoxes and Contradictions 
 
Authentication is the core security requirement in VANET 
and is strong using Digital signature. It provides message 
integration in order to avoid message manipulation. 
Furthermore, Asymmetric ciphers are fantastic for encrypting 
small amounts of random data, such as session keys and 
message digests. They are also used for digital signature 
which is typically much slower than a Symmetric ciphers. 
While it is possible to use a symmetric cipher for message 
authenticity, a symmetric cipher cannot provide non-
repudiation which creates the paradox within Authentication 
mechanism with the speed able to vary significantly from one 
scheme to the other. Existing systems available for VANET 
sill do not fully combine Efficiency, Security and Traceability 
despite the number of robust systems been proposed in recent 
years. This is because Effective security was still an ill-
defined problem in VANETs. Therefore, securing effectively 
a vehicular network is still an unsolved problem.  
3.5 Effective Security Mechanism Requirements 
Security and privacy issues are fairly common to most mobile 
and wireless network settings [13]. Indeed, security is 
amongst the essential user’s requirement in VANET and it 
will be difficult to convince drivers to use this emerging 
technology unless they have a guaranty of its effectiveness. 
Therefore, an Effective security system could not be achieved 
if attributes such as traceability, unlinkability, anonymity in 
addition to the existing security measures are not taken into 
consideration. This section includes a list of critical VANET 
requirements for an effective security mechanism. 
 
5 
3.5.1 Logical Security  
A number of authentication mechanisms have been 
introduced in recent years, aiming to authenticate the validity 
of users while increasing security and privacy in a VANET 
enabled environment. Such techniques includes 
Pseudonymous certificates, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), 
Vehicular Public Key Infrastructure (VPKI) composed by a 
set of Trusted Third Parties (TTPs) in charge of managing 
pseudonymous certificates with a single root Certificate 
Authority (CA) in each administrative domain (e.g. Country) 
with a delegated CA in each region within that domain. In 
other instance, Symmetric as well as Asymmetric 
Cryptography concepts were used sometime in combination 
with Digital Signature algorithm (DSA). Below are some 
widely used protocols. 
 
 
x Authentication. This service is concerned with assuring 
that the origin of a message is correctly identified. 
Vehicles reactions to events should be based on 
legitimate messages. This attribute is the core security 
requirement in VANET. 
x Integrity. This service assures that system assets and 
information transmitted over the network cannot be 
altered by unauthorised parties. Indeed these 
modifications may include writing, deleting or changing 
the status of transmitted messages. 
x Confidentiality. In VANET, vehicles send and receive 
safety as well as non-safety messages from either vehicle 
to vehicle (V2V) or vehicle to infrastructure (V2I). This 
service ensures that the transported information is kept 
secret from all unauthorised parties and cannot be 
eavesdropped on its way between the sender and the 
receiver. 
x Privacy. Recognised as an important factor for the public 
acceptance and for the successful deployment of this 
developing technology. Individuals are increasingly 
concerned about Big Brother enabling technologies. This 
property is achieved when two related goals are satisfied 
(traceability and unlinkability). This service ensures 
that user is able to maintain control of personal data and 
his/her location. This service also secures other 
information related to the vehicle from unauthorised 
parties. These facts may include driver identity, their 
driving behaviour, Electronic License Plate (ELP), 
vehicle’s speed, internal car sensors, past and present 
location of the vehicle.  
x Availability. This service requires all nodes to be able to 
send information at any time. The main purpose of 
VANET was to use technology to serve users by making 
driving more secure and comfortable. As a result, if the 
network is not available for communication, then 
VANET become useless. Information should be 
omnipresent and the network must be available at all 
times as many applications require real-time 
communication with fast response time. Any form of 
delay may make a specific message become meaningless, 
leading to terrible accidents or much bigger disasters. 
x Access control. This service provides users with the 
ability to restrict access to resources reserved for 
privileged entities. Access control policies can be 
implemented on Road Side Unit (RSU) allowing limited 
access to other vehicles infrastructure and application 
data through communication channels. 
x Non-repudiation. This requirement also called 
auditability [5] is a service that prevents the sender or 
receiver from denying reception of a transmitted 
message. Moreover they can prove that a particular 
message has been received or sent. 
x Multi-hop communication. Applications of VANETs 
technologies will occur in situations like battlefields, 
major disaster areas and outdoor assemblies. Therefore, 
being characterized by an unpredictable mobility, 
Vehicle should have the properties allowing them to 
communication in a multi-hop fashion. 
x Real-time Guarantee. A high volume of messages 
broadcast within this context have real-time requirements 
and some delays in response time may be disastrous. But 
due to the high mobility of nodes and the dynamic nature 
of the network topology, managing real time constraints 
is a very challenging task. Safety and non-safety 
applications are time sensitive as users need the right 
information at the right time. The system should be 
designed to serve users while allowing applications to 
send and receive signals with a minimal level of delay. 
3.5.2 Physical Security 
Securing hardware components involved in vehicular 
communication is also an important requirement for an 
effective security mechanism. Devices such as Event Data 
Recorder (EDR), Tamper-Proof Device (TPD), vehicle 
sensors, Global Positioning System (GPS), radars and 
computing platform embedded in smart vehicles were initially 
designed to work separately. Therefore to have a secured and 
reliable vehicular network, the designed effective security 
mechanism must be carefully planned and all above 
equipment properties must be considered despite the great 
challenges to prevent highly motivated adversary from 
launching robust attacks. The process of vehicle identification 
should be performed by both vehicle manufacturers and legal 
authorities. Manufacturers will assign a special identification 
number (VIN) to each vehicle and an Electronic License Plate 
(ELP) will be provided by transportation authorities as a legal 
requirement. Furthermore, relying only on physical security 
measures would not be sufficient for an effective security 
mechanism. 
 
4. Proposed Model towards an Effective 
Security Mechanism in VANETs 
 
After introducing our broad categories of attacks model, this 
section outlines an Effective Security Model for VANETs. 
In the field of Information Technology, it is argued that a 
guaranteed 100% security is not realistic. Therefore the best 
approach to tackle existing issues left unaddressed and 
achieve an acceptable level of security will depend on 
6 
balancing the technologies deployed. Schemes such as 
TESLA++ and VAST presented in earlier publications [10] 
were characterized by a combination of a number of 
Authentication and cryptographic techniques. In [6] Raya and 
Hubaux classified the safety messages into three classes, 
based on their properties related to privacy and real-time 
constraints. As shown on Figure 4, Physical and logical 
security should be considered during the scheme design 
process. And the way forward will be to determine the most 
suitable intersection point able to satisfy effectively all key 
security properties as discussed above. The designed 
mechanism could then be tested using existing simulation 
tools. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion and Future work 
 
In this paper, we investigate the issue of Effective Security in 
vehicular Ah Hoc Networks. We start our study by giving a 
clear definition of effective Security in the context of 
Vehicular ad hoc networks and the reason it was still and ill-
defined problem. We then analyse security issues, possible 
attackers and classified attacks into broad categories. 
Furthermore, Security requirements were discussed and an 
Effective Security Model for VANETs was then proposed. 
In future work, we can identify a suitable intersection point 
connecting an effective security requirement. Suggest an 
enhanced security mechanism which will then be tested with 
a suitable simulation tools under a number of mobility 
scenarios. 
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